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Sammendrag 
EUs kvotesystem for klimagassutslipp har ikke bidratt til særlig lavere utslipp av klimagasser fra 
norske bedrifter, viser ny studie. Kvotesystemet har derimot hatt positiv effekt på bedriftenes 
verdiskapning og produktivitet. 
 
I studien «The impacts of the EU ETS on Norwegian plants’ environmental and economic 
performance» ser forskerne Marit E. Klemetsen, Knut Einar Rosendahl og Anja Lund Jakobsen på 
effektene av EUs kvotesystem for klimagassutslipp (EU ETS). Forskerne undersøker i hvilken grad 
kvotesystemet har påvirket utslipp, utslippsintensitet, verdiskaping og produktivitet blant norske 
bedrifter.  
 
Ikke mindre utslipp 
Både kvoteprisen og tildelingen av kvoter har variert betydelig mellom de tre fasene av kvotesystemet 
(henholdsvis 2005-7, 2008-12, og 2013-20). 
 
Resultatene fra studien viser noen tendenser til negative effekter på utslipp i fase 2, men ingen effekt 
på utslippsintensitet i noen av fasene. Videre finner forskerne positive effekter på verdiskaping og 
produktivitet for de regulerte bedriftene i fase 2, men ikke i de to andre fasene. De positive effektene 
kan skyldes den store mengden gratiskvoter, og at bedriftene i noen grad har overveltet økte 
marginalkostnader på konsumentene. Resultatene fra denne studien indikerer at norske bedrifter i snitt 
ikke vil lide økonomiske tap dersom flere kvoter ble auksjonert heller enn tildelt gratis. 
 
Hjørnesteinen i klimapolitikken 
Kvotesystemet er regnet som hjørnesteinen i Norges og EUs klimapolitikk, men det har vært reist 
spørsmål om effektene av systemet. Dette skyldes at kvoteprisene har vært lave, og at bedriftene i stor 
grad har fått tildelt gratis utslippskvoter.  
 
Tilgang til detaljerte data for årene 2001-13 gir forskerne muligheten til å studere potensielle effekter 
på bedrifters adferd. Resultatene gir noe støtte for at utslippene blant norske bedrifter falt som følge av 
kvotesystemet i fase 2, men ikke i de to andre fasene.  
 
 
1 Introduction
Since the establishment of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in 2005, emis-
sions trading has been the cornerstone policy instrument to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in Europe. The aim of this paper is to investigate how the ETS regulation has
aﬀected the environmental and economic performance of Norwegian plants, particularly in
the manufacturing industries. The ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS lasted from 2005 to 2007,
the second from 2008 to 2012, while the third lasts from 2013 to 2020. We are mainly in-
terested in whether plants regulated by the ETS have reduced their emissions as a result
of the regulation. Emissions reductions can take place by scaling down production or by
reducing emissions per output (or both). Thus, we also examine the eﬀects of the ETS on
emissions per output, which we refer to as emissions intensity. A positive price on emissions
allowances (or quotas) should provide incentives to cut back on emissions. However, the
price of allowances has periodically been rather low, moderating these incentives. Moreover,
abatement often takes place through investments in new equipments and machinery, which
may be driven by expected future emissions prices rather than current prices. Manufacturing
plants have received most of the allowances they have used for free, and it is questionable
how this have aﬀected plants' incentives to reduce emissions.
We are also interested in estimating the eﬀects of the ETS on economic performance
through measures such as value added and productivity. On the one hand, environmental
regulation puts constraints on plants (directly or indirectly), suggesting that plants on aver-
age are worse oﬀ after the regulation. On the other hand, the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and
Van der Linde, 1995) suggests that environmental regulation can increase plants' productiv-
ity and competitiveness as it provides incentives to innovate. When it comes to emissions
trading, the extent of free allocation obviously also matters: If plants receive most of their
allowances for free, and are able to pass on most of the marginal cost increase to consumers,
they may be better oﬀ than without the ETS. The European European Commission (2015)
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ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant share of the emissions price is passed on to consumers for a number
of products regulated by the EU ETS.
There are relatively few econometric studies of the EU ETS, and no such previous stud-
ies using Norwegian data (as far as we know). Martin et al. (2015) sum up the empirical
evidence for the EU ETS so far, both with respect to emissions and ﬁrms' performance,
distinguishing between studies using aggregate data and studies using micro-data. Eller-
man and Buchner (2008) use aggregate data to empirically examine the eﬀects of the two
ﬁrst years of the EU ETS (2005-06). They ﬁnd that some emissions reduction took place,
tentatively 2.5-5 percent. Similar conclusions are obtained by Egenhofer et al. (2011) for
the years 2008-09. Anderson and Di Maria (2011) (phase I) and Bel and Joseph (2015)
(phase I and II) use panel data based on countries' total emissions to estimate the extent
of abatement, and ﬁnd quite similar results as Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Egenhofer
et al. (2011). Despite the emissions reduction, Ellerman and Buchner (2008) also conclude
that a signiﬁcant overallocation occurred for some sectors and countries in the ﬁrst phase,
i.e., many plants received more allowances than their business-as-usual emissions.1
We are aware of only three studies on the eﬀects of the EU ETS using ﬁrm or plant level
data. Wagner et al. (2014) use plant-level data for France to estimate the eﬀects of the two
ﬁrst phases of the EU ETS. They ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant emissions reductions in phase II,
as well as indications of emissions reductions in phase I. On average emissions were reduced
by 15-20 percent. A large share of the emissions reductions were due to increased use of
natural gas instead of coal and oil. Similarly, Petrick and Wagner (2014) use plant-level
data for German manufacturing ﬁrms for the years 2005-10, and ﬁnd evidence of emissions
reductions in the second phase: Emissions were reduced by on average one ﬁfth according
to their estimates. Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) also consider the years 2005-10, using plant-
1Jarait
e-Kaºukausk
e and Kaºukauskas (2015) show that ﬁrms with few installations and less trading experience
were less likely to participate in the ETS market in the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS, and traded lower quantities of
allowances. They point to transaction costs as an explanation for this ﬁnding, together with an inclination among
smaller ﬁrms to use allowances for compliance only. Hence, emissions reductions could be limited despite a positive
price on emissions.
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level data for Lithuania, ﬁnding no reductions in emissions, but a slight improvement in
emissions intensity in 2006-7 (their data did not allow them to study eﬀects on emissions
intensity beyond 2007). There also exist studies on other emissions trading systems using
micro-data, such as Fowlie et al. (2012) who investigate eﬀects of the Southern California's
NOx Trading Program (RECLAIM). The four above mentioned studies exploit that only
a subset of plants or ﬁrms were selected for program participation and identify the closest
match among the plants or ﬁrms not selected for participation.2
When it comes to economic performance, Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
impacts of the EU ETS on Lithuanian ﬁrms' proﬁtability. Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) use
micro-data to estimate the eﬀects of the EU ETS on revenues of German ﬁrms in 2005, ﬁnding
no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Commins et al. (2011) also use micro-data for European companies to
study the eﬀects of the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS on ﬁrms' performance, ﬁnding negative
impacts on both value added and productivity. On the other hand, Bushnell et al. (2013)
ﬁnd that stock prices for carbon-intensive manufacturing industries in Europe fell when the
price of allowances dropped by 50 percent in April 2006, suggesting that the EU ETS may
have had a positive impact on ﬁrms' economic performance. Similar ﬁndings were obtained
by Veith et al. (2009) for electricity generators regulated by the EU ETS.3
We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, as already indicated there
are few econometric studies of the EU ETS using micro-data. Decisions regarding emissions
reductions take place at the plant level, and quotas have been allocated to individual plants
based on their historic activity (emissions or output) or planned capacity. Thus, studying
the impacts of the EU ETS should ideally be carried out at the plant level, which we do
using Norwegian data. Second, our speciﬁcation allows us to compare the eﬀects of the
diﬀerent phases. This is important as allocation rules and quota prices have diﬀered much
2Martin et al. (2014) use micro-data to analyze the impacts of the UK carbon tax, ﬁnding strong negative eﬀects
on energy intensity and use of electricity at manufacturing plants.
3Linn (2010) uses stock prices to estimate the eﬀects on proﬁts of ﬁrms regulated by the NOx cap-and-trade
program in the eastern US, ﬁnding substantial reductions in proﬁt despite free allocation of allowances. There is also
a related strand of literature estimating the price drivers in the EU ETS (e.g., Hintermann 2010; Creti et al. 2012).
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between phases. Third, our rich data set allows us to control for plant heterogeneity through
a number of control variables. For instance, we indirectly control for carbon taxes on fossil
fuels combustion, using plant speciﬁc data on relative energy prices (dirty vs clean).
Our paper also relates to the large theoretical literature on emissions trading, including
the literature on impacts of quota allocation. The seminal paper by Montgomery (1972)
shows that both auctioning and lump sum allocation of allowances lead to the same cost-
eﬀective outcome (assuming a perfectly competitive allowance market). However, allocation
of allowances in the EU ETS has to some degree been conditioned on plants' activity level,
and hence may have inﬂuenced plants' decisions.4 The eﬀects of diﬀerent allocation rules have
been studied analytically and numerically by e.g. Böhringer and Lange (2005), Rosendahl
(2008) and Golombek et al. (2013). In the third phase beginning in 2013, allocation has
shifted towards benchmarking, or output-based allocation. As shown by Rosendahl and
Storrøsten (2015), this gives ﬁrms more incentives to reduce emissions intensities than auc-
tioning (or lump sum allocation). On the other hand, it is also possible that foresighted ﬁrms
correctly anticipated that allocation of allowances would be based on their historic emissions
a few years before the ETS was implemented, giving them incentives to increase emissions
in some years before 2005.5
In order to identify the causal eﬀects of the ETS, we exploit that only a subset of the
plants were selected for participation. Other plants, at least in the manufacturing industries
which we focus on, were mainly left unregulated with respect toGHG emissions, or have been
paying a carbon tax (see Section 3.2). Similar to Wagner et al. (2014), Petrick and Wagner
(2014), Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) and Fowlie et al. (2012), we use matching methods based
on the program participation selection criteria in order to identify a comparable control
4For instance, new plants have received allowances for free, whereas plants closing down are no longer entitled to
free allowances in the future. This is to some degree intentional, as policy makers in Europe do not want ﬁrms to
simply relocate to other jurisdictions with lax climate policies. See the substantial literature on carbon leakage, e.g.,
Martin et al. (2014), Böhringer et al. (2014), Böhringer et al. (2012), Fischer and Fox (2012).
5In the ﬁrst two phases, allowances to Norwegian plants were grandfathered based on their emissions in 1998-2001.
For EU countries, the base years diﬀered somewhat. For several EU countries, the base years for allocation in the
second phase included 2005, i.e., the ﬁrst year of the ﬁrst phase (Hintermann, 2010).
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group of plants that were not selected for program participation. Then we use diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences, and as an alternative, a ﬁxed eﬀects model, to investigate the eﬀects of the ETS
while controlling for a number of other important variables.
Our results indicate weak evidence of emissions reductions among Norwegian plants in
the second phase of the ETS, but no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the two other phases. Moreover,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects on emissions intensity of any of the three phases. Further, we
identify positive eﬀects of the second phase on both value added and productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some background
information on the ETS. Section 3 contains a description of the data and of the variables
used in the empirical analysis. The econometric model and the results are presented in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy implications.
2 The Norwegian and the EU Emissions Trading System
The EU ETS regulates greenhouse gas emissions from energy production and some large
manufacturing industries (see Ellerman et al. (2015) for a recent overview). Initially only
CO2 was included, but later other GHGs in selected industries have been added. The
number of regulated industries has also increased somewhat over time.
The ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS (2005-07) is referred to as a pilot phase, covering around 40
percent of CO2 emissions in the EU (cf. EU's quota directive 2003/87/EF). The allocation
of allowances was determined by the member states, but had to be accepted by the EU
Commission. Almost all allowances were allocated for free, mostly based on plants' historic
emissions (grandfathering). Whereas the price of allowances reached high levels in the ﬁrst
half of this period (up to 30 Euro per ton), the price plummeted towards zero in 2007 as it
was clear that total allocation of allowances exceeded total emissions during this three-year
period.
In the ﬁrst phase, Norway had an ETS that was not formally linked to the EU ETS.
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However, the Norwegian authorities accepted EUAs (i.e., EU ETS allowances) in its own
ETS. Thus, Norwegian plants could buy allowances from EU plants, but not vice versa. The
trade was very limited, however, accounting for only about 0.1 percent of total emissions by
Norwegian ETS plants. As Norway introduced CO2 taxes in many sectors of its economy in
the 1990's, several industries (most importantly the oil and gas industry) were not regulated
by the ETS in the ﬁrst phase although corresponding industries in the EU were regulated
by the EU ETS. Merely 10 percent of Norwegian CO2 emissions, mostly from the processing
industries, were regulated by the ETS in the pilot phase. Allocation of allowances was based
on plants' emissions in the years 1998-2001. The very limited purchase of EUAs by Norwegian
plants may suggest that the overall allocation was quite generous; this is conﬁrmed by the
fact that total allocation to Norwegian plants in the ﬁrst phase exceeded total emissions by
8 percent. It is therefore relevant to ask whether Norwegian plants were facing a positive
emissions price at all during phase I. At least the EUA price seems to have played a minor
role for these plants, given the negligible trade in allowances between Norwegian and EU
plants.6
In the second phase (2008-12) the industry coverage of the EU ETS was quite unchanged,
except that the aviation industry was regulated from 2012. The allocation of allowances
mostly followed the procedure from the ﬁrst phase. Again the price of EUAs started at quite
high levels (above 20 Euro per ton), but following the ﬁnancial crisis evolved in late 2008,
and the subsequent economic recession, the price of emissions dropped to more moderate or
low levels (6-17 Euro per ton) for the rest of phase II.
From 2008 Norwegian plants were fully allowed to trade EUAs with EU plants. Moreover,
Norway was no longer allowed to exempt indistries from the ETS, such as e.g. the oil and
gas industry). In addition, nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from production of nitric acid
in Norway were opted in. Thus, the share of Norwegian GHG emissions regulated by the
6According to the registry of the Norwegian Environment Agency, total trade in allowances between Norwegian
plants during phase I amounted to around 2.5 percent of total regulated emissions. Almost 90 percent of this trade
took place after the EU ETS price fell and then stayed below 1 Euro per ton in the spring of 2007.
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ETS increased to around 45 percent, comparable with the corresponding EU share. The
allocation was still based on emissions in the years 1998-2001, but plants with increased
production and emissions since the base period received additional allowances for free.
In the third phase (2013-2020) additional industries and gases, such as perﬂuorocarbons
(PFCs) from aluminium production, have been included. Around half of the CO2 emissions
and 40 percent of the GHG emissions in the EU are now regulated by the EU ETS. The
allocation rules have been harmonized across member states, and an overall EU cap has been
set. Whereas almost all allowances were given out for free in the ﬁrst phase, and more than
90 percent in the second phase, electricity generation is no longer entitled to free allocation
(except in some member states). Other industries still get large amounts of allowances,
though, especially if they are categorized as signiﬁcantly exposed to carbon leakage. The
allocation rule has shifted towards mostly output-based allocation (benchmarking), based
on plants' output in the years 2007-08. The price of EUAs has initially been low (3-9 Euro
per ton in 2013-15), partly because of the continued economic downturn and partly because
a large share of allowances in the second phase was banked to the third phase.
Norway was allowed to auction a larger share of its allowances in the second phase, but
the EU harmonization in phase III also applies to Norway. Hence, whereas the Norwegian
oil and gas industry did not receive any allowances for free in phase II, they received a
substantial number in phase III (as did manufacturing industries).
Figure 1 illustrates the development over time in total emissions of CO2, N2O and PFCs
(measured in CO2 equivalents) from all Norwegian manufacturing plants regulated by the
EU ETS in 2013. Total CO2 emissions from these plants have shown little variation during
the estimation period, and were in 2013 2.6 percent below the level in 2004 (the last year
before the ETS was implemented), but 1.8 percent above the level in 2001. The highest
level was observed in 2010, shortly after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008-09. Emissions of N2O,
which were regulated by the ETS from the second phase, declined substantially from 2005
to 2009, whereas emissions of PFCs, which were regulated from the third phase, declined
10
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Figure 1: Total annual emissions of CO2, N2O, and PFCs (in million tons of CO2-
equivalents) from Norwegian manufacturing plants regulated by the ETS in 2013.
signiﬁcantly from 2008 to 2010. As a consequence, total GHG emissions from the regulated
plants have declined notably since the ETS was established in 2005, but at least for some
plants the emissions reductions took place before they became regulated by the ETS.
Figure 2 illustrates the trend in yearly mean prices along the right-hand vertical axis and
the annual mean plant emissions along the left-hand vertical axis. The emissions curves are
phase speciﬁc, so that for instance the curve "Phase II plants" shows how plant emissions
(on average) have developed over time for plants that were regulated from phase II and
onwards. The ﬁgure seems to indicate a small reduction in mean plant emissions for phase I
plants from 2005 and for phase II plants from 2008, but emissions were on average declining
also the year before phase I and phase II plants became regulated. In order to examine the
eﬀects of the regulation, we have to identify a relevant comparison group and also account
for the variation in other variables than the ETS regulation.
11
05
10
15
20
25
Qu
ot
a 
pr
ice
 (fi
xe
d e
uro
s p
er 
ton
)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
CO
2 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
s 
(in
 10
00
 to
ns
)
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Phase I plants Phase II plants
Phase III plants Quota price per ton (annual mean)
Figure 2: Annual mean emissions of CO2, N2O, and PFCs (in 1000 tons of CO2-equivalents)
of ETS regulated plants in the manufacturing industries (left hand axis) and real (deﬂated
to 2013) ETS quota prices (right hand axis)
3 Data sources and description of variables
We have constructed a plant-level panel data set that draws on several data sets from diﬀerent
sources. All data sets are merged using organizational number of the subsidiary as the plant
identiﬁer. The data span 13 years, from 2001 to 2013. A key data set comprises the data
from the Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) on annual emissions of all Norwegian plants
regulated by the Norwegian ETS or the Norwegian Pollution Control Act, including emissions
of CO2, N2O and PFCs (measured in CO2 equivalents).
7 This data set allows us to identify
whether the plant is regulated by the ETS or not, and in which phase they enter.
The data mentioned above are supplemented with annual plant level data containing
information on number of employees, man hours, value added, energy use and prices, industry
7According to the Norwegian Pollution Control Act, pollution is in general prohibited, but plants can apply for
pollution permits. The emissions data are publicly available on the Norwegian Environment Agency's website.
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aﬃliation, and more. The data originate from diﬀerent registers at Statistics Norway: Data
on energy use for manufacturing, mining and quarrying; data on structural business statistics
for manufacturing, mining and quarrying. The data set thus cover the industries B-C in the
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC2007). A detailed description of the key variables
is provided below, grouped into two main categories: Emissions, emissions intensity, value
added and productivity; and Control variables, including other relevant GHG regulations.
3.1 Emissions, emissions intensity, value added, and productivity
We study the eﬀects of the EU ETS on several dependent variables: Emissions, emissions
intensity, labor productivity, and value added. Our main measure of a plant's annual emis-
sions includes CO2, N2O and PFCs emissions, all measured in tons of CO2 equivalents. We
also consider an alternative measure of emissions that only include CO2.
Ideally, emissions intensity should be calculated as emissions relative to output produced
(e.g., emissions per ton of steel or per ton of cement). However, as the type of output diﬀers
across plants and industries, it is challenging to compare output quantities across plants.
Moreover, we do not have data for the quantities produced, only the value of production.
Emissions intensities calculated as emissions relative to production value would be sensitive
to changes in the output price. A common measure of emissions intensity is therefore emis-
sions relative to the number of employees (see e.g. Wagner et al., 2014). However, such a
measure does not take into account that some employees have part-time positions, are on sick
leave, work extra hours, etc. Hence, it may be better to use man hours instead of number of
employees. In our main estimations we calculate emissions intensities as emissions relative
to man hours. This is not an ideal measure, as a plant could increase or decrease its labor
intensity during our estimation period. Thus, in Section 4.3 we also consider an alternative
measure of emissions intensities, calculated as emissions relative to electricity use (measured
in kWh per year). However, as the ETS should give incentives to switch between diﬀerent
energy goods, such as replacing coal or oil with electricity, our preferred speciﬁcation is
13
emissions relative to man hours.
Value added at factor prices is the plant's annual gross production value minus the cost
of intermediates plus subsidies and minus taxes (except VAT). Production value is deﬁned
as turnover corrected for changes in stock of ﬁnished goods, work in progress and goods and
services bought for resale. Cost of intermediates is the value of goods and services used as
input in the production process, excluding ﬁxed assets. Our measure of value added is an
oﬃcial measure taken from Statistics Norway.8 The value added in NOK is deﬂated using
the Producer Price Index (PPI) with 2013 as the base year.
Productivity should be measured as output produced relative to the use of input. Again,
good measures of output is challenging to obtain as plants produce diﬀerent types of goods,
and we only have data on production value, not quantities produced. Despite this short-
coming, we use the value added at factor prices as a proxy for output. This measure has
the advantage that it is comparable across plants. Further, we use man hours as a proxy for
input, so that plant productivity is equal to labor productivity, i.e., value added at factor
prices per man hour.
3.2 Control variables
Contrary to studies at the industry level, we are able to take into account plant heterogeneity
in our analysis, and thereby reduce the problem of omitted variable bias. This relates both to
plant characteristics, and to external factors for the plant such as pre-tax prices and carbon
taxes.
Until the ETS was implemented, the cornerstone of Norwegian climate policy was a
non-uniform carbon tax implemented in 1991, with exemptions for many energy-intensive
manufacturing industries. As mentioned earlier, emissions regulated by the carbon tax were
exempted from the ETS in the ﬁrst phase but not in the second phase (e.g., pulp and paper
production and oil and gas production). Only the oil and gas industry had to pay carbon
8A more detailed description of the measures are available at the homepage of Statistics Norway.
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taxes in addition to being regulated by the ETS from 2008.9 As the carbon tax has only been
implemented on the use of fossil fuels, we indirectly control for this tax through plant-speciﬁc
relative energy prices: First, prices of petroleum, coal, gas and electricity are calculated as
the plant's expenses on the respective energy good (in NOK) relative to the corresponding
energy content (in kWh). Then the relative energy price at the plant level is calculated as
the price of dirty energy (weighted petroleum, coal and gas prices) relative to the price of
clean energy (electricity). Electricity is characterized as clean since there is no emissions
from electricity use and also since renewable power (mainly hydro power) accounts for more
than 95 percent of Norwegian electricity production in the estimation period. Changes in
relative input prices can provide incentives for input factor substitution towards relatively
inexpensive input factors (Hicks, 1932).10
Besides the ETS and the carbon tax, there have been arrangements between the Ministry
of Climate and Environment and the processing industry in Norway to reduce aggregate
GHG emissions (i.e., emissions not covered by the ETS or the tax). These arrangements
covered e.g. N2O emissions from the production of nitric acid and PFCs emissions from
aluminium production, which were both later regulated by the ETS (since respectively 2008
and 2013). One arrangement had a target for the year 2007, while the follow-up arrangement
had a target for the period 2008-12. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and
Environment (2014, p. 98), reductions in N2O emissions from the production of nitric acid,
due to the use of a new technology, was suﬃcient to fulﬁll the ﬁrst arrangement. Thus, it is
diﬃcult to know whether these arrangements have had any inﬂuence on emissions, and how
the arrangement may have incentivized emissions reductions at the plant level.
When it comes to plant characteristics, we use the number of employees as a measure
of plant size. Common trends in emissions are controlled for using time dummies (one for
each phase). All determinants of emissions intensity at the industry level are controlled
9Domestic aviation, which was included in the ETS from 2012, also pays a carbon tax.
10As changes in the carbon tax show up in changes in the relative energy price, this means e.g. that the estimated
eﬀects of the ETS for plants that were initially regulated by the tax, at least in principle apply to the eﬀects of the
ETS as such, and not to the net eﬀects of replacing the carbon tax with the ETS.
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Figure 3: Mean plant emissions and emissions intensities (emissions per man hour) across
aggregated manufacturing industries. CO2, N2O and PFCs measured in CO2 equivalents.
for through the use of industry dummies (the aggregated industries are listed in Table 3 in
Section 3.3). Figure 3 shows the plants' mean emissions and emissions intensity of CO2,
PFCs and N2O (all measured in CO2 equivalents) per aggregated manufacturing industry
in the estimation period. We see that plants in Manufacturing of metals and minerals have
the highest emissions and also the highest emissions intensities. Plants in Manufacturing
of chemicals, pharmaceutics, rubber and plastic also have high emissions and emissions
intensities compared to the other four aggregate industries shown in the ﬁgure.
3.3 Sample summary statistics
Our initial sample of 665 incorporated Norwegian plants contains 4872 plant-year observa-
tions. Of these, 150 plants are regulated by the ETS at least one year. A small franction of
the regulated plants are in industries other than the manufacturing industries or Mining and
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Table 1: Summary statistics1 before matching, 2001-2013
ETS plants Non-ETS plants
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
CO2, N2O and PFCs emissions
2 271,544 50,341 3,886 60.7
CO2 emissions 177,695 47,340 3,835 47.9
CO2, N2O and PFCs emissions intensity
2 12.3 .19 .133 .0006
CO2 emissions intensity 12.1 .18 .132 .0006
Labor productivity3 .541 .412 .625 .324
Number of employees 211 161 125 77
Relative energy prices (dirty over clean) 1.05 .86 1.16 .98
Value added3 213,260 89,385 74,707 38,736
Electricity use (kWh) 486,111 99,953 23,079 7,114
Man hours 381,436 263,336 203,462 122,597
Wages3 102,060 72,922 51,836 30,064
Operating proﬁts3 119,672 45,223 51,801 20,583
Number of plant-year observations 150 515
Numer of plants 1126 3746
1For 665 plants and 4,872 plant-year observations in the manufacturing industries.
2All emissions are reported as tons of CO2-equivalents
3All values in million NOK are deﬂated using the PPI with 2013 as base year.
Extraction. The plant level data from Statistics Norway do not cover these industries, and
thus these plants are dropped. The control group is selected from the total population of
plants emitting CO2, N2O or PFCs using nearest neighbor propensity score matching (see
Section 4). Our ﬁnal unbalanced panel data set consists of 1,567 plant-year observations and
152 plants in the manufacturing industries, 72 of which are regulated by the ETS.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and demonstrates how ETS and non-ETS plants
diﬀer with respect to the diﬀerent variables before the matching procedure. Table 2 illustrates
the same descriptive statistics for the matched sample, i.e. the treatment and the control
group. The matching procedure reduces the diﬀerences between the treatment group and
the non-treated (the control group) substantially with respect to almost all variables (the
exceptions are labor productivity and relative energy prices, where the diﬀerences are quite
small in any case). For instance, before matching the emissions intensity of the control group
was only 1.1 percent of the emissions intensity of the treatment group. After the matching
procedure the emissions intensity of the control group constitutes 11 percent of the emissions
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Table 2: Summary statistics1 after matching, 2001-2013
Treatment group Control group
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
CO2, N2O and PFCs emissions
2 347,810 53,341 9,530 2,117
CO2 emissions
2 138,033 51,300 9,480 1,971
CO2, N2O and PFCs emissions intensity
2 .621 .279 .068 .030
CO2 emissions intensity
2 .407 .221 .057 .028
Labor productivity3 .57 .31 .42 .30
Number of employees 234.8 188 216.5 168
Relative energy prices (dirty over clean) 1,06 .86 1.33 1.09
Value added3 228,832 112,443 105,149 66,663
Electricity use (kWh) 571,235 176,062 65,701 19,205
Man hours 387,927 293,730 301,543 231,761
Wages3 91,607 62,522 59,134 38,923
Operating proﬁts3 103,752 46,253 68,069 41,252
Number of plant-year observations 743 824
Numer of plants 72 80
1For 152 plants and 1,567 plant-year observations in the manufacturing industries.
2All emissions are reported as tons of CO2-equivalents
3All values in million NOK are deﬂated using the PPI with 2013 as base year.
intensity of the treatment group. Note that the diﬀerences between the treatment and control
plants also include any eﬀects from the ETS regulation. As seen from Table 3, there are no
plants from the industries Mining and extraction (excluding oil and gas) and Oil and gas
extraction in our ﬁnal data set, which comprises only the manufacturing industries. The
reason for this is that the matching procedure does not ﬁnd any neighbors outside the
manufacturing industries as nearly all Oil and gas extraction plants are regulated by the
ETS, and very few Mining and extraction (excluding oil and gas) plants are regulated by
the ETS.11
Figure 4 illustrates the mean annual emissions intensities (index) for the matched sample
(see Section 4) of plants that operate during the entire estimation period (plants that enter
or exit during the estimation period are left out). The ﬁgure shows the changes in GHG
emissions (CO2, N2O and PFCs) per man hour for the three diﬀerent groups of treated
11A large share of the regulated plants that are excluded through the matching procedure are oil and gas ﬁelds. The
time paths of emissions and emissions intensities for these ﬁelds are highly inﬂuenced by the depletion of the ﬁelds'
reservoir. See Gavenas et al. (2015) for a study of CO2 emissions from Norwegian oil and gas ﬁelds.
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Table 3: Share of plant-year observations across industries, 2001-2013
Before matching After matching
ETS plants Non-ETS plants Treatment Control
Industry Percent Percent Percent Percent
Mining and extraction (excluding oil and gas) 0.6 6.3 0 0
Oil and gas extraction 33.4 0.7 0 0
Manuf. of textiles and food 6.5 38.9 8.2 36.5
Manuf. of wood, pulp and paper 14.8 3.8 22.2 8.3
Manuf. of chem., pharmac., rubber and plastic 14.2 19.6 23.2 19.8
Manuf. of metals and minerals 26.2 18.1 46.4 34.4
Manuf. of machinery and electronics 4.3 12.5 .03 1.0
Total 100 100 100 100
(ETS-regulated) plants and for the control group (matched plants not regulated by the ETS).
We see that plants included from phase I display increasing trends in emissions intensities
until 2004, before phase I was initiated, and then again in 2005-07, before phase II was
initiated. On the other hand, emissions intensities for this group decrease substantially
when phase I starts in 2005 and when phase II starts in 2008. The increasing trends can
possibly be due to adaptations if the plants expect the free quotas to be allocated based on
previous emissions. Our empirical speciﬁcation in Section 4 does not capture such potential
adaptations. The decrease from 2007 to 2008 is possibly due to the high quota price in 2008,
although we notice a decrease in emissions intensities for both regulated and unregulated
plants in 2008. For plants included from phase II, emissions intensities appear to have
decreased substantially from 2008 (when phase II started) and onwards. Plants included from
phase III display a decreasing emissions intensity trend over most of the period, including
2013 (the year phase III was initiated). As 2013 is the last included year in the data,
we cannot observe how emissions intensities have responded after this phase was initiated.
Finally, plants which were never regulated by the ETS display similar trends as the plants
which were included in phase III.
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Figure 4: Plant mean annual emissions intensities (CO2 - equivalent emissions of CO2, N2O
and PFCs per man hour). Index: 2001=1
4 Empirical model and results
Our main objective is to investigate the eﬀects of the ETS on Norwegian plants' environ-
mental performance (emissions and emissions intensity) and economic performance (value
added and productivity). Similar to Fowlie et al. (2012), Petrick and Wagner (2014), Wag-
ner et al. (2014) and Jaraite and Di Maria (2016), we exploit the fact that only a subset
of the plants were selected for participation in the ETS. The selection for ETS participa-
tion of a plant is based on the type of pollutant, the plant activity (production of speciﬁc
types of goods) and the capacity limit.12 We do not observe all these factors for plants that
12The capacity limit is speciﬁed as e.g. total thermal eﬀect (typically 20 MW), or tons of products (steel, cement
etc.) per hour or 24 hours. As the regulator selects plants for participation in the ETS based on the capacity limit,
regression discontinuity constitutes as a suitable method for estimating the eﬀects of the ETS (see e.g. Lee and Lemieux
(2010)). However, the capacity limit varies with the main activity of the plant, and we do not have comparable data
on the activity of the plants in the control group. Also, there is a lot of missing values for the measures of capacity.
With an already small sample of Norwegian plants, it would thus not be manageable to use regression discontinuity
methods based on the capacity limit.
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are not regulated by the ETS. For each plant regulated by the ETS we identify the closest
matches among the plants not selected for participation in the ETS based on the propensity
score.13 The propensity score is the probability of receiving treatment conditional on some
matching variables. The variables used are proxy measures of the participation requirements
of the ETS.14 In this way we identify a comparable control group of plants that were not
selected for program participation. The probability of receiving treatment is conditional
on the observed values in the year 200115 of the matching variables: We require an exact
match16 on type of pollutant as the ETS only regulates emissions of CO2, N2O (from nitric
acid production since 2008) and PFCs (from aluminium production since 2013). We also
require exact matching on our proxy for plants' type of activity, i.e., the industry aﬃliation
speciﬁed by standard industrial codes at the 2-digit level.17 Finally, as continuous matching
variables we include predetermined levels of emissions (as a proxy for capacity limit) and
number of employees (as a measure of plant size). As Table 3 illustrates, only plants in the
manufacturing industries are included in the estimation sample.
The plants in the control group remained either unregulated (with regard to greenhouse
gas emissions) or were regulated by a carbon tax, which we control for through the relative
energy price variable. As plants above the capacity limit typically emit more than those
below the limit, plants in the control group have lower average emissions than plants in the
treatment group (see Table 2 in Section 3.3). However, as we are not interested in esti-
mating absolute changes in emissions levels, but relative changes in emissions and emissions
13The matching procedure used is the STATA routine psmatch2 with 1-10 nearest neighbor matching. We perform
a robustness test using 1-3 neighbors (see Section 4.3).
14The participation requirements are found in Law on Greenhouse Gas Emissions ("Klimakvoteforskriften").
15The EU ETS was initiated in 2005, but was announced some years before (cf. Convery, 2009). In March 2000,
a Green Paper on emissions trading was issued by the EU Commission, and hence the year 2000 can be seen as the
announcement year of the EU ETS (cf. Wagner et al., 2014). In June 2001, the Norwegian government discussed
through a White Paper a possible Norwegian ETS from 2005 (Norwegian Ministry of Environment, 2001). Nine
months later, a new White Paper announced the start-up of the Norwegian ETS from 2005 (Norwegian Ministry of
Environment, 2002). Hence, the plants' predetermined characteristics in 2001 are used as matching variables. An
implication of this is that we do not allow entry of new plants after 2001 in our dataset. The unbalance in the dataset
is thus only due to plant exit.
16To require an exact match means that the matching procedure is only allowed to pick control plants with exactly
the same matching variable value (in this case, a plant that emits the exact same type of pollutant).
17We perform a robustness test using the 3-digit level (see Section 4.3).
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intensities, the comparability issue is less severe.
We calculate diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, and as an alternative estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model,
on the matched sample to investigate the relation between each ETS phase and respectively
emissions, emissions intensity, value added, and productivity, controlling for a number of
other important variables. The sample average treatment eﬀect is estimated using dummy
variables for each phase, which indicates whether the plant participated in the ETS during
this phase or not. We henceforth use the subscript i to denote the plant, t to denote year,
and p to denote the phase.
4.1 Basic DID
For all four dependent variables (emissions, emissions intensity, value added and productiv-
ity), in general denoted Y , we estimate a basic DID. We deﬁne
Eit =
{
1 if plant i is ETS-regulated in year t
0 if plant i is not ETS-regulated in year t
Let Ti be the ﬁrst year plant i is regulated by the ETS, and τ (p) the start-up year of
phase p, respectively 2005, 2008, and 2013 for phase I, II and III.18 We specify our model
in logarithmic form which means that we can interpret the estimates in terms of relative
changes:
log Yit = α0 +
∑
p∈{1,2,3}
pip I
(
τ (p) ≤ t < τ (p+ 1)
)
+
∑
p∈{1,2,3}
γp I
(
τ (p) ≤ Ti < τ (p+ 1)
)
+βp
∑
p∈{1,2,3}
Eit × I
(
τ (p) ≤ t < τ (p+ 1)
)
+ X′itb + it (1)
In equation (1) α0 is the constant term. The next terms are time dummies for each phase.
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The parameters pip thus pick up common trends during the phases not attributed to the ETS.
18Our data is limited to 2001-2013 and thus we only include the ﬁrst year of phase III.
19We include time dummies for each phase instead of year dummies because of the need for parsimony. This means
that the time eﬀects are constrained to be constant within each phase.
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The parameters γp are phase-group ﬁxed eﬀects that capture the mean diﬀerence before
treatment between each phase-group (i.e. plants entering in phase I, II and III) and the
control group. The phase-group ﬁxed eﬀects thus take into account heterogeneity between
groups of plants that enter the ETS in diﬀerent phases. This can potentially matter, as
phase I only included a sub-sample of the plants emitting CO2, whereas nitric acid production
plants emitting N2O entered from phase II, and aluminium producing plants emitting PFCs
entered from phase III.
The parameters of main interest, βp, capture the treatment eﬀects from being regulated
by the ETS in phase p (i.e., whether the plant is regulated in year t interacted with the time
dummies). The interaction term, Eit × I (τ (p) ≤ t < τ (p+ 1)), is thus equal to 1 if plant i
is regulated by the ETS in year t and phase p includes year t. Note that plants entering in
phase p are assumed to be aﬀected by treatment also in subsequent phases as they remain
regulated in the later phases. Moreover, we assume that the eﬀect of phase p regulation is
the same for all plants regardless of when they entered the ETS. Our speciﬁcation takes into
account that the quota prices, and also the quota allocation rules, diﬀer between the phases.
Hence, also the treatment eﬀects may diﬀer phases. With respect to emissions and emissions
intensities, we expect a negative estimate of βp, to the degree that the plants are incentivized
to reduce emissions because of the regulation. For value added and productivity, the eﬀects
could go in either direction, and thus we do not have any prior expectation regarding the
sign of the estimate of βp.
The vector Xit contains the control variables described in Section 3.2, including dummies
for industries (see Table 3 for a list). The error term, it, is assumed to be independent of
the covariates in Xit, the time dummies, the phase group ﬁxed eﬀect, and the treatment
variable. Number of employees is lagged by one year (t− 1) to avoid the potential problem
of reversed causality and to reduce potential problems of simultaneity. The empirical results
related to this speciﬁcation are displayed in columns (1)-(2) in Tables 4 and 5, where we
investigate the eﬀects of participation in the ETS on emissions and emissions intensity, as
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well as in columns (1)-(2) in Table 6, where the eﬀects on value added and productivity are
shown. Before discussing the results in Section 4.3, we present an alternative speciﬁcation.
4.2 Panel data regressions with plant speciﬁc eﬀects
It is possible that plant speciﬁc eﬀects are not fully taken care of by the phase group ﬁxed
eﬀects, which capture the mean diﬀerence between the treatment groups (plants entering in
phase I, II and III) and the control group not attributed to the regulation (cf. the speciﬁ-
cation in equation (1)). The validity of equation (1) rests most critically on the assumption
that the treatment variables are independent of the unobserved plant speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
An endogeneity problem occurs if unobserved variables that aﬀect the dependent variables,
also aﬀect the treatment variables. One solution could be to use instrumental variables,
i.e., variables that contribute to exogenous variation in the selection into treatment, but do
not have an eﬀect on the dependent variables per se. However, we are not aware of any
variables that qualify as instruments. Instead, the solution we favor is to allow correlation
between unobserved plant speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, νi, and the treatment variables. Rather than
simply including group ﬁxed eﬀects to capture the ﬁxed diﬀerence between the treatment
group and the control group (γp from (1)) we therefore include a plant ﬁxed eﬀect (νi) in
this speciﬁcation:
log Yit =
∑
p∈{1,2,3}
pip I
(
τ (p) ≤ t < τ (p+ 1)
)
+
∑
p∈{1,2,3}
βpEit × I
(
τ (p) ≤ t < τ (p+ 1)
)
+X′itb + νi + it (2)
The results are displayed in column (3) in Tables 4 and 5 (for emissions and emissions
intensity), and in columns (2) and (4) in Table 6 (for value added and productivity). We
acknowledge that the basic speciﬁcation in equation (1) does not solve the simultaneity issues.
Most importantly, plants that are regulated by the ETS are likely to be more emissions
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intensive than plants not regulated by the ETS. Including phase-group ﬁxed eﬀects instead
of plant ﬁxed eﬀects will thus lead to positive correlation between the error term and the
treatment variables. Hence, the speciﬁcation in equation (2) is more appropriate for causal
interpretations. However, the speciﬁcation in equation (1) is much more parsimonious,
which in particular can matter for such a small data set as we employ here. Moreover, the
speciﬁcation in (1) allows us to control for plant size, relative energy prices, industry speciﬁc
eﬀects, phase group speciﬁc eﬀects and phase time speciﬁc eﬀects. We thus argue that the
version of the basic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation in equation (1), where we include
control variables (i.e. column (2) in Tables 4-5 and columns (1)-(2) in Tables 6-7), also
provides results that can reasonably be interpreted as treatment eﬀects of the ETS.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Emissions and emissions intensity
The estimated eﬀects of the ETS on emissions are presented in Table 4. Columns (1)-
(2) display the results of the basic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation (1), without and
with control variables, respectively, whereas column (3) displays the results of speciﬁcation
(2), i.e., including plant ﬁxed eﬀects. The speciﬁcation of equation (1) excluding control
variables (column (1) in Tables 4-5) is mainly considered for descriptive purposes, as we
believe industry eﬀects, plant size and relative energy prices are important drivers of the
dependent variables. The estimated coeﬃcients of main interest (βp) are displayed in the
three ﬁrst rows. The estimate of βp is the relative change in expected emissions resulting
from participation in phase p.
From the results in Table 4, according to all speciﬁcations in columns (1)-(3), it appears
that phase I had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on emissions. The same applies to phase III, although
the estimated eﬀects are consistently negative in all three speciﬁcations. In phase II, on
the other hand, we the estimated eﬀects on emissions is negative. In the basic diﬀerence-
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in-diﬀerences model in column (1), the estimate (-0.59) is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
This could indicate large decreases in emissions from participation in phase II of the ETS,
i.e., around 45 percent (e−0.59−1 = −0.45). This is in line with what we observed in Figure 2
above. However, when we add control variables, the estimated emissions reduction is lowered
to -0.36 and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (see column (2)). The estimate drops further
to -0.33 (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level) when plant ﬁxed eﬀects are taken into account,
cf. column (3). Overall, we see some tendencies of emissions reductions due to the ETS in
phase II.
Next, we test the one-sided hypothesis that there has been no emissions reduction due
to the ETS in any of the three phases, i.e., we test the one-sided null hypothesis that
min (β1, β2, β3) ≥ 0, against the alternative that at least one of the coeﬃcients is negative,
i.e., min (β1, β2, β3) < 0. We perform a one-sided test as the expectation from economic
theory is that the ETS should cause a negative change in emissions. Based on the test
results we can only weakly reject the null hypothesis (at the 10 percent level) and only in
the most basic model (column (1)). The p-values range from 10 to 25 percent across the
speciﬁcations. The test results indicate that the estimated negative eﬀect of phase II could
be random. However, if any emissions reduction can be ascribed to the ETS, it likely took
place in phase II rather than in phase I or III. Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that β1 = β2 = β3, although in the most basic model in column (1) the p-value is not far
from the 10 percent rejection level (14 percent). Moreover, the hypothesis that β1 = β2 = β3
is rejected in the robustness test reported in Table 7 (column (3)) in Section 4.3.3 where
we only include emissions of CO2. This indicates that the speciﬁcation where we allow the
eﬀects of the ETS to diﬀer between phases is the most appropriate one.
A possible explanation for the lack of emissions reductions of phase I could be that in this
phase, Norway had an ETS that was not formally linked with the EU ETS. As explained
in Section 2, Norwegian plants could buy but not sell quotas to plants in EU countries.
The extent of buying quotas from EU plants was tiny, which is understandable as the total
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allocation to Norwegian plants exceeded total emissions by 8 percent during phase I. Hence,
it is tempting to conclude that there was no binding cap on emissions from Norwegian plants
in the ﬁrst phase. The lack of eﬀect for phase I could also be related to the fact that this
was a pilot phase, and that the plants needed time to adjust to a new regulation. It is also
possible that plants expected allocation in future phases to be based on their emissions levels
during phase I, in which case there could actually be some incentives to inﬂate emissions.
Moreover, it may take time to adjust to a new regulatory regime. Decisions about activity
level and investments in new equipment typically take time, and there may be also be some
gradual learning eﬀects about how to reduce emissions in a cost-eﬀective way. Allocation
has been quite generous also in phase II and (for most manufacturing plants) in phase III,20
but as plants have been fully allowed to trade allowances with EU plants as of 2008 (ﬁrst
year of phase II), the ETS price should have been of importance. The price of allowances
has changed over time, and was on average much higher in phase II than in phase III. This
could possibly explain why we ﬁnd som indications of an eﬀect of phase II but not of phase
III.
20In phase III, the allocation rules were changed more signiﬁcantly, but most of the manufacturing industries still
receive close to 100 percent of the allowances they need for free (cf. Section 2).
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Table 4: Eﬀects on CO2 equivalent tons of CO2, N2O and PFCs
Response variable: (1) (2) (3)
Log of emissions Coef. Est. Est. Est.
Treatment Phase I β1 -.02 .01 -.07
ﬀﬀf (.20) ﬀﬀf (.21) ﬀﬀf (.17)
Treatment Phase II β2 -.59** -.36* -.33*
(.29) (.22) (.20)
Treatment Phase III β3 -.17 -.15 -.13
(.42) (.41) (.39)
Time dummy Phase I pi1 -.33** -.16 -.20*
(.15) (.16) (.11)
Time dummy Phase II pi2 -.32** -.18 -.31
(.22) (.19) (.19)
Time dummy Phase III pi3 -.40 -.15 -.44
(.40) (.41) (.41)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase I γ1 3.60*** 3.54***
(.47) (.47)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase II γ2 2.88*** 3.73***
(.64) (.52)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase III γ3 4.93*** 3.84***
(.51) (.57)
Log of relative energy prices -.21** -.07
(.10) (.05)
Log of number of employees .97*** .83***
(.19) (.24)
Plant speciﬁc eﬀects νi No No Yes
Plant speciﬁc control variables No Yes Yes
Industry dummies No Yes Yes
Number of plant-year obs. 1,454 1,454 1,454
Number of plants 144 144 144
Equation (1) (1) (2)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Treatment
plants are matched to control plants based on predetermined values of CO2, N2O and PFC
emissions, number of employees, and exact matching on industries at the 2-digit level.
Column (1) is a basic DID speciﬁcation. Column (2) is a basic DID with additional
control variables. Column (3) is a panel data regression with plant ﬁxed eﬀects and
additional control variables.
Tests of hypotheses:
(1) (2) (3)
One-sided test of no eﬀect in any phase: p-value p-value p-value
Ho : min (β1, β2, β3) ≥ 0 .10 .24 .25
Wald test of equality of coeﬃcients:
Ho : β1 = β2 = β3 .14 .41 .43
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Regarding the control variables, we ﬁrst observe that emissions reductions seem to have
taken place in all three phases, independently of the ETS. All estimated coeﬃcients for
the time dummies (pip) are negative, although whether these are signiﬁcant diﬀer somewhat
between phases and speciﬁcations. In columns (1)-(2), where ﬁxed eﬀects are at the group
level rather than at the plant level, we see that plants entering in phase III have higher
average emissions levels than plants entering in phase I and II. Furthermore, the estimated
eﬀect of relative energy prices is -0.21 in column (2), signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. A 10
percent increase in relative energy prices would according to this result lead to a 2.1 percent
reduction in emissions. However, in column (3) the estimate is only -0.07 and not signiﬁcant
at conventional levels. The estimated eﬀect of plant size (log of number of employees) varies
from 0.83-0.97 and is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in both column (2) and (3). A 10
percent increase in number of employees thus leads to an increase in emissions by 8.3-9.7
percent, indicating that emissions are close to proportional to plant size. Both these results
are as expected.
Next, we investigate the eﬀects on emissions intensity. From the results displayed in Table
5, there appears to be no signiﬁcant eﬀects of any of the three phases on emissions intensity.
The estimated eﬀects of phase I have both positive and negative signs depending on the
speciﬁcation. The estimates of β2 and β3 are negative in all speciﬁcations, but the estimates
are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This may suggest that, to the extent that the ETS
participation led to emissions reductions in phase II, this occurred through reduced activity
level (and thus emissions) rather than through reduced emissions intensity. This could for
instance be the case for some plants if it is costly to reduce emissions per output, and at the
same time diﬃcult to pass on the higher costs to the consumers (e.g., because they operate
in a global competitive market). Hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that none of the
phases have caused any emissions intensity reduction. This is also the conclusion when we
test the null hypothesis that there has been no emissions intensity reduction in any of the
three phases against the alternative that at least one of the phases had such an eﬀect (i.e.,
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the hypothesis that min (β1, β2, β3) ≥ 0 vs. min (β1, β2, β3) < 0).
When it comes to the control variables, we see from Table 5 that none of the estimates
corresponding to the time dummies (the coeﬃcients pip) are signiﬁcant, with the exception
of phase I in the basic model in column (1). The signs of the estimated coeﬃcients are
consistently negative across phases and speciﬁcations, but we cannot conﬁrm signiﬁcant
changes in emissions intensity independently of the ETS during any of the phases. The
positive and signiﬁcant estimates of phase group ﬁxed eﬀects (γp) suggest that plants entering
in phase III are more emissions intensive than plants entering in earlier phases (and much
more emissions intensive than plants not regulated by the ETS). Moreover, a 10 percent
increase in relative energy prices is estimated to reduce emissions intensity by 2.1 percent
(signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level) according to the results of column (2). This is similar to
the case of emissions (Table 4). In column (3), however, the estimate is lower and no longer
signiﬁcant. Finally, whereas larger plants (not surprisingly) were estimated to have higher
average emissions (cf. Table 4), we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of number of employees
on plants' emissions intensity (this is consistent with the close to proportional eﬀect on
emissions level in Table 4).
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Table 5: Eﬀects on emissions intensities (emissions per man hour)
Response variable: (1) (2) (3)
Log of emissions intensity Coef. Est. Est. Est.
Treatment Phase I β1 .13 .03 -.05
ﬀﬀf (.19) ﬀﬀﬀ (.21) ﬀﬀﬀ (.17)
Treatment Phase II β2 -.38 -.32 -.28
(.26) (.22) (.20)
Treatment Phase III β3 -.19 -.13 -.10
(.43) (.41) (.38)
Time dummy Phase I pi1 -.24* -.08 -.11
(.14) (.16) (.11)
Time dummy Phase II pi2 -.28 -.15 -.26
(.21) (.19) (.19)
Time dummy Phase III pi3 -.32 -.23 -.36
(.42) (.41) (.42)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase I γ1 3.52*** 3.52***
(.47) (.47)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase II γ2 2.79*** 3.78***
(.53) (.52)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase III γ3 4.52*** 3.84***
(.45) (.57)
Log of relative energy prices -.21** -.08
(.10) (.06)
Log of number of employees -.02 -.01
(.18) (.23)
Plant speciﬁc eﬀects νi No No Yes
Plant speciﬁc control variables No Yes Yes
Industry dummies No Yes Yes
Number of plant-year obs. 1,449 1,449 1,449
Number of plants 144 144 144
Equation (1) (1) (2)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Treatment
plants are matched to control plants based on predetermined values of CO2, N2O and PFC
emissions, number of employees, and exact matching on industries at the 2-digit level.
Column (1) is a basic DID speciﬁcation. Column (2) is a basic DID with additional
control variables. Column (3) is a panel data regression with plant ﬁxed eﬀects and
additional control variables.
Tests of hypotheses:
(1) (2) (3)
One-sided test of no eﬀect in any phase: p-value p-value p-value
Ho : min (β1, β2, β3) ≥ 0 .18 .27 .35
Wald test of equality of coeﬃcients:
Ho : β1 = β2 = β3 .18 .46 .50
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4.3.2 Value added and productivity
We also investigate the eﬀects of the ETS on real value added and (labor) productivity
among Norwegian plants. The results are displayed in Table 6. Columns (1)-(2) display the
results of the basic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation (equation (1)), whereas the results
in columns (3)-(4) display the results of the plant ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation (equation (2)).
The estimates of βp now reﬂect the expected relative change in value added and productivity
due to participation in a given phase.
For phase II, the estimated eﬀects on both value added and productivity are positive
and signiﬁcant. In both speciﬁcations, the estimated eﬀect of phase II on value added is
0.25 (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level), which implies an estimated 28 percent increase in
value added. The estimated eﬀect of phase II on productivity is 0.25-0.26 (signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level in column (2) and at the 5 percent level in column (4)). For phase I and
III, the estimated eﬀects on value added and productivity are positive but not signiﬁcant
(across all speciﬁcations). However, we do reject the hypothesis that there is no eﬀect on
value added and productivity in any of the three phases, in the two-sided21 null hypothesis
that min (β1, β2, β3) = 0, against the alternative that min (β1, β2, β3) 6= 0. The p-values are
within the 5 percent level across all speciﬁcations.
The positive eﬀects on value addded and productivity of phase II may seem a bit strange
as the environmental regulation puts constraints on the plants. However, as discussed in the
introduction, there are several possible reasons why the ETS might increase value added and
productivity. First, the manufacturing plants receive large amounts of free allowances. If
they are able to reduce their emissions at relatively low costs, they can sell excess allowances
and earn a proﬁt that possibly exceeds their abatement costs. Moreover, if the marginal costs
are (partly) passed on to consumers, their revenue could increase. The fact that we only ﬁnd
signiﬁcant positive eﬀects in phase II can be due to the relatively higher average quota price in
21As economic theory is ambivalent with regards to whether environmental regulations cause positive or negative
changes in value added and productivity, we now use a two-sided rather than a one-sided test.
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this phase compared to phase III, and the fact that Norway had an ETS that was not formally
linked with the EU ETS in phase I. As mentioned in the introduction, Bushnell et al. (2013)
show that stock prices for European carbon-intensive manufacturing industries declined when
allowance prices were halved in April 2006, suggesting a positive relationship between quota
prices and economic performance for the regulated plants. Second, the Porter Hypothesis
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) points to the fact that environmental regulations give more
incentives to innovate, which may spur productivity and competitiveness. However, as this
process is likely to take some time, the former explanation may be more plausible.
For all speciﬁcations we can reject, within the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance, the hy-
pothesis that β1 = β2 = β3, conﬁrming that the estimated eﬀects diﬀer across phases. Our
speciﬁcation which allows the eﬀects to diﬀer across phases is thus the most appropriate one.
Regarding the control variables, we see that there are signiﬁcant increases in value added
and productivity during all three phases independently of the ETS (see the estimates of pip).
Moreover, the results suggest that plants entering in phase I and phase III are characterized
by higher value added and higher productivity than plants entering in phase II and plants
never regulated by the ETS (again independently of the ETS). We identify positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀects of relative energy prices on value added and productivity in columns (1)-
(2). The estimates are 0.06 in both columns, signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, implying
that a 10 percent increase in relative energy prices is estimated to increase value added
and productivity by 0.6 percent. It is diﬃcult to say whether this result is simply due to
lower prices of electricity (recall that the relative energy price is calculated as the price of
fossil energy over the price of electricity), or if it is related to the Porter hypothesis. In the
model with plant ﬁxed eﬀects in columns (3)-(4), the estimates are positive but no longer
signiﬁcant. Finally, a 10 percent increase in the number of employees is estimated to increase
value added by 7.1-9.8 percent (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in both models). Columns
(2)-(3) indicates no diﬀerence in productivity based on the size of the plant. Hence, we do
not observe any scale eﬀects.
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Table 6: Eﬀects on value added and productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Response variable: Log of Log of Log of Log of
value added productivity value added productivity
Coef. Est. Est. Est. Est.
Treatment Phase I β1 .01 .01 .02 .01
(.11) (.11) (.11) (.11)
Treatment Phase II β2 .24** .26*** .24** .25**
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10)
Treatment Phase III β3 .05 .04 .05 .07
(.17) (.17) (.17) (.17)
Time dummy Phase I pi1 .29*** .38*** .25*** .35***
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.04)
Time dummy Phase II pi2 .47*** .52*** .44*** .52***
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Time dummy Phase III pi3 .50*** .56*** .42*** .55***
(.14) (.14) (.14) (.14)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase I γ1 .48*** .47***
(.09) (.09)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase II γ2 .05 .10
(.15) (.14)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase III γ3 .65*** .66***
(.11) (.11)
Log of relative energy prices .06** .06** .004 .002
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Log of number of employees .98*** .02 .71*** -.07
(.05) (.05) (.14) (.08)
Plant speciﬁc eﬀects νi No Yes No Yes
Plant speciﬁc control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of plant-year obs. 1,567 1,564 1,567 1,564
Number of plants 152 151 152 151
Equation number (1) (1) (2) (2)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Treatment
plants are matched to control plants based on predetermined values of CO2, N2O and PFCs
emissions, number of employees, and exact matching on industries at the 2-digit level. Columns
(1)-(2) are simple DID estimations with additional control variables. Columns (3)-(4) are
panel data regression with plant ﬁxed eﬀects and additional control variables.
Wald tests of hypotheses:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Two-sided test of no eﬀect in any phase: p-value p-value p-value p-value
Ho : min (β1, β2, β3) = 0 .05 .04 .05 .03
Test of equality of coeﬃcients:
Ho : β1 = β2 = β3 .05 .03 .05 .03
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4.3.3 Robustness tests
To investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings we perform several robustness tests. First,
we replicate Tables 4-5 with emissions of CO2 only (i.e., excluding N2O and PFCs). This
is a relevant robustness test as relatively few plants have emissions of N2O or PFCs that
are regulated by the ETS. The reason for this is partly that CO2 emissions are much more
widespread than emissions of other greenhouse gases, but also because the ETS has mainly
focused on CO2 emissions. Obviously, this speciﬁcation is more likely to accurately estimate
the potential eﬀects on CO2 emissions.
The results are displayed in Table 7. In columns (1)-(2) we report the results of the basic
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model with control variables, whereas in columns (3)-(4) plant ﬁxed
eﬀects are included. First, we identify no signiﬁcant eﬀects of either phase I or phase III
in any of the speciﬁcations. This is similar to the results when all three greenhouse gases
are included. Second, the estimated eﬀects of phase II are negative across all speciﬁcations,
but not signiﬁcant at conventional levels (the lowest p-value of 0.11 is obtained in columns
(3)-(4) where we estimate the eﬀects on emissions and emissions intensity including plant
ﬁxed eﬀects). The estimated eﬀect on emissions (-0.26) is quite similar to the corresponding
estimate in Table 4 (-0.33), i.e., when also N2O and PFCs are included. In any case, we
cannot reject in any speciﬁcation the hypothesis that there is no eﬀect of any of the three
ETS phases on emissions and emissions intensity. However, in columns (3)-(4) we can reject
that the eﬀects of the phases do not diﬀer, which validates our speciﬁcation allowing the
eﬀects to diﬀer across phases.
Regarding the control variables, we identify general CO2 emissions and emissions intensity
reductions in phase I and II that are not due to the ETS (however, the signiﬁcance levels
depend on the speciﬁcation). Moreover, we still see a tendency that plants that entered
the ETS in phase III had slightly higher emissions and emissions intensities than plants
that entered in earlier phases, and that plants regulated by the ETS have higher emissions
35
and emissions intensities than plants never regulated by the ETS. We identify negative and
signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level) eﬀects of relative energy prices on CO2 emissions and
emissions intensity in columns (1)-(2). The estimates are about -0.3 for both variables,
implying that a 10 percent increase in relative energy prices is estimated to decrease CO2
emissions and emissions intensity by 3 percent. In the model with plant ﬁxed eﬀects in
columns (3)-(4), the estimated eﬀect on emissions intensity drop (in absolute value) to -0.03,
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, whereas the estimated eﬀect on emissions (0.02) is not
signiﬁcant. Finally, a 10 percent increase in the number of employees is estimated to increase
CO2 emissions by 6.2-8.9 percent (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in both speciﬁcations).
The eﬀect of an increase in the number of employees on CO2 emissions intensity is negative
and signiﬁcant in the basic speciﬁcation, suggesting scale eﬀects. However, this eﬀect is no
longer there in the speciﬁcation that includes plant speciﬁc eﬀects.
We also perform a number of robustness tests for which we do not provide tables. We
replicate the results of Tables 5 and 7 using the alternative measure of emissions intensity
mentioned in Section 3.1  emissions relative to electricity use. The results are largely
conﬁrmed and the estimated coeﬃcients and the corresponding p-values are similar to those
reported in Tables 5 and 7. Next, we replicate Tables 4-7 on a sample with 1:3 nearest
neighbor matching rather than 1:10. Again, the estimated coeﬃcients and the corresponding
p-values are very similar to those reported in Tables 4-7.
Finally, we replicate Tables 4-7 on a sample of treated and non-treated plants that are
matched at the 3-digit industry level (rather than at the 2-digit level as in our main model).
The estimated eﬀects of phase II on emissions and emissions intensities (Tables 4-5 and 7)
are no longer signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This is possibly related to the drop in number
of plant-year observations from 1,567 to 1,134. However, the estimated eﬀects of phase II on
economic performance still hold. We identify signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on value added and
productivity in phase II across all speciﬁcations. The eﬀects of phase II on value added lie
in the range 31-32 percent, whereas the eﬀect on productivity lie in the range 28-30 percent.
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Table 7: Eﬀects on CO2 emissions and emissions intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Response variable: Log of CO2 Log of CO2 int. Log of CO2 Log of CO2 int.
Coef. Est. Est. Est. Est.
Treatment Phase I β1 .20 .23 .05 .07
(.14) (.14) (.10) (.10)
Treatment Phase II β2 -.19 -.14 -.26 -.22
(.18) ﬀ (.18) ﬀ (.14) ﬀ (.13)
Treatment Phase III β3 -.08 -.06 -.01 .02
(.29) (.30) (.22) (.22)
Time dummy Phase I pi1 -.28** -.20* -.20* -.11
(.11) (.11) (.10) (.10)
Time dummy Phase II pi2 -.36** -.24* -.14 -.10
(.13) (.13) (.12) (.13)
Time dummy Phase III pi3 -.09 -.04 -.20 -.12
(.26) (.27) (.22) (.22)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase I γ1 3.07*** 3.03***
(.42) (.41)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase II γ2 2.76*** 2.80***
(.54) (.55)
Group ﬁxed eﬀect Phase III γ3 3.33*** 3.34***
(.51) (.52)
Log of relative energy prices -.30*** -.30*** -.02 -.03*
(.09) (.09) (.02) (.02)
Log of number of employees .62*** -.39** .89*** .01
(.17) (.17) (.18) (.12)
Plant speciﬁc eﬀects νi No Yes No Yes
Plant speciﬁc control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of plant-year obs. 1,352 1,348 1,352 1,348
Number of plants 143 143 143 143
Equation number (1) (1) (2) (2)
Notes: *** p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Treatment
plants are matched to control plants based on predetermined values of CO2 emissions, number
of employees, and exact matching on industries at the 2-digit level. Columns (1)-(2) are simple DID
estimations with additional control variables. Columns (3)-(4) are panel data regression with
plant ﬁxed eﬀects and additional control variables.
Tests of hypotheses:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One-sided test of no eﬀect in any phase: p-value p-value p-value p-value
Ho : min (β1, β2, β3) ≥ 0 .38 .48 .14 .21
Wald test of equality of coeﬃcients:
Ho : β1 = β2 = β3 .11 .14 .03 .04
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined impacts on Norwegian plants of the EU Emissions Trading
System for the years 2005-2013, using micro-data at the plant level. We have found somewhat
mixed results, both with respect to emissions and economic performance.
Our estimation results suggest that the ETS may have led to signiﬁcant emissions reduc-
tions in the second phase (2008-12). However, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects in the
ﬁrst phase (2005-7) or the third phase (2013). Nor can we reject the joint hypothesis test
of no eﬀect in any phase. Moreover, the results do not hold in the robustness test where
we match at a more detailed industry level. Thus, the emission reduction found in phase
II should be interpreted with caution. Moreover, when we estimate the eﬀects on emissions
intensities, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects in any of the phases.
The limited eﬀects on emissions and emissions intensity in our estimations can possibly be
explained by the fact that the manufacturing industries have received close to a 100 percent
of the quotas they need to cover their business-as-usual emissions. Surplus quotas could in
principle have been sold to other plants, but the substantial allocation of quotas in the EU
ETS (and other factors such as the ﬁnancial crisis) have led to low quota prices. Thus the
incentives for emissions reductions have been small throughout most of the period of EU
ETS. When it comes to phase I, Norway was not formally linked to the EU ETS, and it may
be questioned whether there was any binding cap on emissions for most Norwegian plants in
this phase. Finally, the quota price was on average higher in the second phase than in the
beginning of the third phase, which may explain why we ﬁnd signiﬁcant emissions reductions
of phase II but not of phase III.
Our results further suggest that the ETS led to signiﬁcantly higher value added and
productivity in phase II. These ﬁndings are related to the fact that plants on average receive
close to 100 percent of the allowances they need for free. If all allowances were instead
auctioned by the government, the plants' costs would have been higher and thus value added
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and productivity lower. Furthermore, the plants may have been able to pass on (parts of)
the increased marginal costs to the consumers, and hence increase their revenues through
higher output prices. Finally, we notice that increased productivity due to environmental
regulation is also consistent with the Porter Hypothesis.
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in the two other phases on neither productivity nor value
added, although the estimates are consistently positive. The explanation for ﬁnding positive
and signiﬁcant impacts on economic performance only in phase II could be that the quota
price facing Norwegian plants was highest in this phase. Hence, the mechanisms described
in the previous paragraph were likely strongest in the second phase. The extent of allocation
to manufacturing plants have not changed substantially between the phases.
In our study we control for phase time speciﬁc eﬀects. However, it is possible that treated
plants were diﬀerently aﬀected by e.g. the ﬁnancial crisis if they were more or less trade
exposed than the control group. To our knowledge, empirical studies on the eﬀects of the
ETS on plants' or ﬁrms' emissions so far rely on matching methods in combination with
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategies. However, diﬀerences between regulated and unregulated
plants might not be fully accounted for. As the regulator selects plants for participation in
the ETS based on the capacity limit (e.g., total thermal eﬀect or tons of products), regression
discontinuity constitutes a suitable method for estimating the eﬀects of the ETS. For further
analysis on larger data sets, regression discontinuity methods should be considered.
From a policy perspective, our results do not give clear conclusions with regard to whether
emissions trading lead to lower emissions. As emissions trading is a quantity instrument, it
should in theory lead to emissions reductions if the cap is set below the unregulated emissions
level. However, in our study we have only looked at Norwegian plants, and not all European
plants regulated by the EU ETS. Moreover, since plants are allowed to bank allowances to
the next phase, and also buy oﬀsets from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), it is
far from obvious how much overall emissions are reduced within a given phase.
Our results also suggest that Norwegian plants on average would not be negatively af-
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fected by the ETS even if more of the allowances were auctioned instead of given away for
free to the plants. Free allocation of allowances is mainly motivated by the risk of carbon
leakage. However, Martin et al. (2014) show that the current allocation in the EU ETS
results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. As allocation rules
are determined at the EU level (also for the non-EU member Norway), the Norwegian au-
thorities are not in a position to adjust the allocation. Nevertheless, our results should be
relevant when considering the extent of allocation, both at the EU level and more generally.
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